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ARE SIN AND EVIL NECESSARY FOR A REALLY 
GOOD WORLD? QUESTIONS FOR 
ALVIN PLANTINGA’S FELIX CULPA THEODICY
Kevin Diller
Arguably, the most philosophically nuanced defense of a Felix Culpa theodicy, 
born out of serious theological refl ection, is to be found in Alvin Plantinga’s 
recent article entitled “Superlapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa.’” In this paper I 
look at Plantinga’s argument for the necessity of evil as a means to God’s far 
greater ends and raise four objections to it. The arguments I give are aimed at 
the theological adequacy of explaining the emergence of evil as a functional 
good. I conclude that Plantinga’s Felix Culpa approach fails to demonstrate the 
necessity of evil for heightened intimacy with God, and collides with agent-
centered considerations. Moreover, I argue that all Felix Culpa theodicies re-
verse the apparent value God places on means and ends in the economy of 
salvation, while lending to evil a potentially morally and theologically dis-
torting rational legitimacy.
O Goodness infi nite, Goodness immense!
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good; more wonderful
Than that which by creation fi rst brought forth
Light out of darkness! Full of doubt I stand,
Whether I should repent me now of sin
By me done, and occasioned; or rejoice
Much more, that much more good thereof shall spring;
To God more glory, more good-will to Men
From God, and over wrath grace shall abound.
(Paradise Lost, xii. 469–78)1
In the words of Adam, who has been given by the Archangel a view of 
God’s redemptive plans, this is the locus classicus of Milton’s expression of 
the Felix Culpa, the fortunate fall or happy sin, in response to which God 
brings about a greater paradise than the one lost—a
far happier place
Than this of Eden, and far happier days.2
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Its presence in Milton may serve to explain why there was discussion 
of Felix Culpa theodicies in the Journal of English Literary History well 
before it drew the interest of twentieth century philosophers of religion. 
The Latin expression, ‘O Felix Culpa,’ has for centuries been found in an 
ancient hymn incorporated into the Roman Catholic Easter Vigil liturgy, 
which at length proclaims:
O assuredly necessary sin of Adam, which has been blott ed out by 
the death of Christ!
O fortunate fault, which has merited such and so great a Redeemer!3
In Leibnitz’s Theodicy he states,
I have shown that the ancients called Adam’s fall Felix Culpa, a happy 
sin, because it had been retrieved with immense advantage by the in-
carnation of the Son of God, who has given to the universe something 
nobler than anything that ever would have been among creatures 
except for this.4
In his 1966, Evil and the God of Love, John Hick aﬃ  rms the blessedness of the 
fall which makes possible our growth and moral transformation.5 In Paul 
Helm’s 1993, The Providence of God, he endorses the Felix Culpa approach, 
explaining that the fall is a ‘happy fault,’ “because it, and it alone, makes 
possible the divine redemption from which the blessings of pardon and 
renewal follow.”6 Arguably, however, the most philosophically nuanced 
defense of a Felix Culpa theodicy, born out of serious theological refl ection, 
is to be found in Alvin Plantinga’s recent article entitled “Superlapsarian-
ism, or ‘O Felix Culpa.’”7 It is this articulation of a Felix Culpa theodicy 
that I wish to analyze and question. Plantinga’s thoughts warrant close 
and receptive consideration as his contributions to this and other areas of 
interaction between philosophy and theology are in these fi elds ‘tower-
ing and magnifi cent goods.’ In Plantinga’s presentation, he puts forward 
his main argument and then handles some anticipated objections. In this 
paper, I att empt to summarize the core of Plantinga’s argument and then 
raise some objections both for Plantinga’s formulation and for Felix Culpa 
theodicies in general.
Plantinga’s Version of the Felix Culpa Theodicy
Advocating any theodicy whatsoever is a new move for Plantinga. He has 
long argued for a free-will defense but drew a clear distinction between 
defense and theodicy. A defense, merely undercuts the argument that the 
Christian view of God is inconsistent with the existence of evil. A theodicy 
gives an answer to the question, “what is the source of the evil we fi nd, and 
why does God permit it?”8 In his 1983 “Self-Profi le” right before his move 
to Notre Dame, Plantinga says he has never seen a convincing theodicy 
and that, “a Christian must therefore admit that he doesn’t know why God 
permits the evils this world displays.”9 He appears to maintain this posi-
tion right up through Warranted Christian Belief, which in fact contains in its 
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closing chapter all of the elements of his Felix Culpa approach.10 His strat-
egy here, nevertheless, is still only to defend against a potential defeater 
for Christian belief. He refrains from presenting it as a theodicy. In a note 
included in this fi nal chapter of Warranted Christian Belief and referenced 
again in his Felix Culpa article, Plantinga oﬀ ers a quotation from Abraham 
Kuyper which provides some confi rmation that a Felix Culpa theodicy is 
(from a Dutch Reformed point of view anyway) a safe theological option. 
The excerpt from Kuyper is as follows:
The angels of God have no knowledge of sin, hence also they have 
no knowledge of forgiveness, hence again they have no knowledge 
of that tender love that is formed from forgiveness. Nor have they 
that richer knowledge of God which springs from this tenderer aﬀ ec-
tion. They stand as strangers in the face of it, and therefore says the 
Apostle that, with respect to this mystery, the angels are, as it were, 
jealously desirous ‘to look into it.’11
The key point in Kuyper, in Plantinga’s development of the argument, and 
in the Easter liturgy itself is the notion that sin is necessary to achieving 
God’s intended greater goods. The chaos caused by creaturely rebellion is 
the unavoidable collateral damage of a project to bring about good condi-
tions that far outweigh the losses incurred.
Plantinga’s argument progresses from a discussion of the compara-
tive value of possible worlds. The value or disvalue of a possible world 
is a calculation based on an aggregate weighting of the relative values 
and disvalues of the good and bad states of aﬀ airs in that world (p. 5). 
Creaturely goods and creaturely evils are factored in the equation along 
with all other value-measurable states of aﬀ airs. There are, however, some 
states of aﬀ airs that are of exceedingly high value, such that the balance 
of the equation is irreversibly tipped towards the positive. No amount 
of creaturely evil could outweigh it. One of these states of aﬀ airs is the 
existence of God which single-handedly gives a world unlimited value 
(p. 9). And because God is a necessary being, thus existing in all possible 
worlds, there is no possible world that is not a world of unlimited value—
and therefore, “every possible world is a very good world.” It might be 
interesting to think about the value of an argument that stopped there, 
but Plantinga is looking for more than just a defense of God’s goodness. 
“Christian philosophers should also turn to a diﬀ erent task: that of under-
standing the evil our world displays from a Christian perspective” (p. 5, 
emphasis mine).
In Plantinga’s view, although all possible worlds are such that God exists 
and are therefore worlds of unlimited value, some are bett er than others (p. 
9). There is in fact a second great-making feature of some possible worlds: 
the “towering and magnifi cent good of divine incarnation and atonement” 
(p. 9). God’s decision to become incarnate and redeem sinful creatures was 
an act of free grace. There are, therefore, possible worlds in which sinful 
creatures are not redeemed. Such worlds would still be very good worlds; 
since, in all possible worlds, God exists. But worlds containing incarnation12 
and atonement would be far bett er still. In fact, “any world with incarna-
tion and atonement is a bett er world than any without it” (p. 10).13 Once 
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again, no amount of creaturely good or evil can compare with the value of 
this state of aﬀ airs. Plantinga seems to suggest that its unrivaled value has 
a two-fold derivation: fi rst, and foremostly in his exposition, it is derived 
from its being an unsurpassable display of love (p. 7), and second, from 
the fact that it not only eﬀ ects salvation, but enables a greater intimacy or 
fellowship with God than would have been possible without the sin and 
suﬀ ering (pp. 18–19). The conclusion of all of this is quite obvious. In order 
to have incarnation and atonement, there needs to be a state of aﬀ airs for 
which atonement is required. So, “a necessary condition of atonement is 
sin and evil” (p. 12). Therefore we can conclude, “sin and evil is a neces-
sary condition of the value of every really good possible world. O Felix 
Culpa indeed!” (p. 12). This argument is a new species from Plantinga in 
the genus of responses to the problem of evil. This is a theodicy, not merely 
a defense, not merely a defeater defeater, but an explanation for why God 
allows evil—a reason for evil, that does not remove all the perplexity, but 
at a general level gives us an understanding for why it exists.
In addition to the theodicy, Plantinga proposes that this explanation 
sheds light on other related matt ers. Most signifi cantly, it shows that the 
Supralapsarians were right to argue that the decree to save precedes the 
decree to permit the fall. The fall was a regrett ably necessary part of the 
broader, and in that sense logically prior, decision to enhance the world 
through incarnation and atonement.14
In the later part of his essay, Plantinga defends his proposed theodicy 
against a number of objections. Possibly the most signifi cant clarifi cation 
that comes out of his engagement is an argument for the instrumental 
value of suﬀ ering. Suﬀ ering is not just a necessary byproduct of the plan 
to eﬀ ectuate incarnation and atonement, but it also allows us to have a 
kind of intimacy and solidarity with Christ that would not otherwise have 
been possible (pp. 18–19).
Though Plantinga raises a number of other interesting issues in his ex-
position, this brief summary highlights the key features of his argument. 
The great-making value of incarnation and atonement has a dual aspect, 
providing both an unparalleled display of love and an enhancement to 
human intimacy with God. The benefi ts depend on incarnation and atone-
ment, which in turn depend on the emergence of sin and evil in the world. 
Were it not for sin, therefore, this world would miss out on benefi ts that 
incalculably surpass the costs. This leads to the conclusion: ‘O happy sin.’
Objections to Plantinga’s Version of the Felix Culpa Theodicy
1. The Towering Good of Incarnation Requires no Fall
Plantinga reasons that a world with incarnation and atonement must 
contain evil, since atonement implies that there is sin that needs atoning 
for. But if we consider the incarnation alone it is not clear that evil is a 
prerequisite. While it may be true that atonement requires incarnation, it 
is certainly not clear that a world that contains the incarnation must be a 
world that contains evil and atonement. It may be argued that incarna-
tion is a necessary part of God’s taking human suﬀ ering on himself, but it 
is not clear that incarnation requires suﬀ ering,15 nor is it clear that God’s 
purposes in becoming human were exhausted by those which involve 
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suﬀ ering. Thomas Aquinas, in response to the question “whether, if man 
had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?”; responds that 
“even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.”16 To what 
extent does this impact Plantinga’s argument? At no place does Plantinga 
seem to hang his argument on the incarnation alone. The incarnation is 
signifi cant to the argument in that it makes more explicit one aspect of 
divine condescension that contributes to the whole magnifi cent enact-
ment of sacrifi cial love, and Christ’s human suﬀ ering and death would 
have been impossible without it.
Plantinga is surely right to single out the incarnation as a great-making 
feature of the world. But what makes the incarnation of great-making 
value to the world may also have to do with its signifi cant value outside 
of the part that it plays strictly in our redemption from sin. In becoming 
human God creates an opportunity for human intimacy and fellowship 
with God that would not otherwise be possible. The New Testament 
seems to advance the notion that, because God became human, believ-
ers are graft ed together in Christ, and enabled thereby to commune with 
God in a way that would otherwise have been humanly impossible. If 
something like this is the case, then it is by the incarnation that we are, 
“invited to join the charmed circle of the Trinity itself” (p. 18). It may not 
be therefore, as Plantinga—citing Edwards—suggests, that it is primar-
ily by virtue of our suﬀ ering that greater intimacy with God becomes 
possible.17 Neither is it certain—following Kuyper—that this intimacy 
can only be known by those once lost who experience forgiveness and 
rescue. It is extremely diﬃ  cult to imagine what might have been, if sin 
and evil had never arisen. The fact is we are those once lost who now 
experience forgiveness and rescue. The story of the enactment of God’s 
sacrifi cial love is the one in which we fi nd ourselves and at the heart of 
our worship is a reenactment and participation in the broken body and 
spilled blood of our Lord. Yes, the eucharist would not be a proclamation 
of Christ’s death if it had not been for sin and the atonement. But this 
proclamation of his death is only “until he comes,” aft er which intimacy 
with Christ will presumably continue and intensify. While it may be 
true that in our suﬀ ering we are able to participate in the suﬀ erings 
of Christ, it does not follow that there is a unique quality and value to 
this kind of intimacy or avenue to intimacy that could not otherwise be 
achieved, perhaps by the incarnation alone, without suﬀ ering and evil.18 
The body of Christ may have been given to us, without needing to be 
broken for us.
I would propose that, with or without the fall, the incarnation might 
serve as God’s means of drawing us into the kind of closer communion 
with him that transforms us and our relationships. Additionally, incar-
nation alone is a towering and magnifi cent act of divine condescension 
and self-giving, incommensurate with creaturely goods and evils. If this 
is so, could a world with incarnation and no fall be just as good as world 
with atonement that included suﬀ ering and evil?19 I mentioned that in 
Plantinga’s theodicy the unrivaled value of a world with incarnation and 
atonement has a two-fold derivation. The second of the two was the way 
in which sin and suﬀ ering enable a greater intimacy or fellowship with 
God than would otherwise have been possible. But this benefi t of greater 
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human intimacy with God may be won for us by the incarnation alone, 
which in no way requires sin and evil.20
2. The Value Assumption of the Atonement and Relationship with God
If we remove from calculation any reference to the incarnation alone, 
we are still left  with the central and singularly suﬃ  cient component of 
Plantinga’s theodicy. The atonement requires the fall, but the atonement 
is well worth the fall. The atoning work of God in Christ is an act of such 
profound and costly divine love that it stands above all other imaginable 
values (p. 10) and outweighs all other creaturely disvalues. At the heart of 
Plantinga’s argument is the assumption that the enactment or display of 
love that we see in the atonement21 is a great-making state of aﬀ airs. But 
just what is it that is of such great value in a world that contains so trium-
phant a display of sacrifi cial love? We could easily here become embroiled 
in a debate over the nature of love, essence and action. But the question is 
worth raising; would the depths of God’s love for creation have been any 
less if sin and evil had not entered the world? Surely not. In all possible 
worlds God is such that he would take suﬀ ering and sin onto himself if that 
were required for our redemption and for enabling the kind of communion 
with creatures that he desires. Even in worlds without sin—if such worlds 
are indeed possible—the counterfactuals of God’s love are the same.22 Per-
haps Plantinga’s view is not that there would be anything lacking in God’s 
love for us without atonement, but that there would be something lacking 
in our perception of that love.23 It is reasonable to think that it is part of 
God’s loving purposes that the beloved would understand how loved they 
are. The argument, in this case, would be that the enactment of God’s love 
in redemption gives us a view of the nature of that love which we would 
not otherwise have had. But how could we know what God’s limitations 
are with respect to communicating to us a knowledge of the depth of his 
love?24 The weight of the theodicy rests on this assumption, but we are not 
given a good reason to accept it.25
Another assumption that is worth probing has to do with how value 
is derived in Plantinga’s calculations. In a footnote, he explains that he 
avoids taking a position on whether it is “states of aﬀ airs or objects or 
events that are the primary locus of value; in either case states of aﬀ airs 
will be good or bad” (p. 5 n11). This is a helpful move, I fi nd, but it may 
still be that underlying assumptions about the primary locus of value are 
operative in the comparative assessment of the values of states of aﬀ airs. 
For instance, in addition to objects and events, there are of course other 
candidates that might serve as the primary locus of value. Perhaps we 
could take a relational view. It could be that the evaluation of the states of 
aﬀ airs in a world W derives primarily from the kind of right relationships 
that are established by God in W. If this is the case, then with respect to the 
atonement, higher value will be placed on the state of aﬀ airs that God ac-
complishes through suﬀ ering, rather than on the extraordinary suﬀ ering 
itself that God endures. Assessing value in this way seems also to respect 
the apparent order of means and ends in the narrative of divine grace. 
That is to say, the traditional interpretation of the atonement is that it is the 
means to accomplish the end of our redemption. In a Felix Culpa theodicy 
means and ends are changed.26 The fall now becomes the means to the 
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ultimate end of the display of God’s love in the suﬀ ering of the atonement. 
What makes the world great on the Felix Culpa view is the towering good 
of the costliness of God’s loving action, not primarily what is accomplished 
by that action. If right relationship with God is the primary locus of value 
for the states of aﬀ airs that make a world great, then the Felix Culpa view, 
it seems to me, would have litt le to commend it. Relationship with God 
appears to be undervalued, such that it is worth severing the relationship 
so that God can act out in love to restore it. In response, the Felix Culpa 
defender could return to Plantinga’s suggestion, following Kuyper and 
Edwards, that there is a special excellence to the quality of relationship 
that can be known by those once lost who are redeemed.27 While this sug-
gestion may resonate with some of our own experiences in an already fallen 
world, grounding this claim is fraught with diﬃ  culties. How would we 
establish the general principle without suggesting, for instance, that the 
strongest marriages are those that have involved a period of divorce, or 
that the deepest mother-daughter relationship is enabled once the daugh-
ter commits patricide or the like?
One might propose that any world in which God establishes a means 
of right relationship between God and fellow creatures is a world that 
contains a great-making state of aﬀ airs that is incommensurable with 
creaturely goods and evils. Evaluating states of aﬀ airs in terms of their 
positive or negative contribution to right relationship with God seems 
to correspond bett er to the priorities of the gospel. The good news made 
known in Christ is that God loves us so much that becoming human he 
was willing to suﬀ er and die to rescue us for relationship with him, not 
that he loves us so much that he was willing to let that relationship be 
broken in order to orchestrate an opportunity to demonstrate the depths 
of his love.28 Another way to form the objection is to consider how God 
himself might view the value of the atonement. If God’s purpose in atone-
ment is to restore relationship with us, then it is proper to think that close 
relationship with creation is to God of greater value than the cost of the 
atonement. Restoring relationship is worth the sacrifi ce. The Felix Culpa 
approach swaps cost and value in the equation such that the value of the 
sacrifi ce of atonement is considered worth the cost of breaking relationship 
with creation. Furthermore, this objection, it seems to me, has application 
not only to Plantinga’s formulation but to all Felix Culpa theodicies.
3. Agent Centered Restrictions on Suﬀ ering and the Question of Supralapsarianism
A Felix Culpa theodicy maintains that a fallen world is bett er than one 
where there is no fall. It could be asked, however, bett er for whom? 
Plantinga argues that even if it had been within God’s power to create 
a world where free people freely chose not to rebel, it would be bett er 
to create the world where the rebellion occurred. Now, unless univer-
salism is in view, the benefi t does not appear to accrue to each agent 
personally. We might grant that God would permit a person to suﬀ er 
for the benefi t of others and the world, but would God permit someone 
to suﬀ er eternally because their suﬀ ering is an element in the best world 
God can actualize?29 This seems to violate the notion of “‘agent centered 
restrictions’ on the way in which a holy, just and loving God would treat 
us” (p. 23). Plantinga is sympathetic to the theological conviction that 
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God would ensure that in addition to whatever worldwide value is de-
rived from the suﬀ ering of any particular individual there would also be 
some benefi t for the individual him/herself. He says, “perhaps it is also 
true that he would not permit me to suﬀ er for that end, an end outside 
my own good, unless he could also bring good for me out of the evil.” 
But if agent-specifi c restrictions are to be taken seriously, must they not 
at least stipulate that the good which is brought out of the evil for the 
individual be valuable enough to oﬀ set the personal toll? However, for 
Plantinga’s theodicy to be successful, he must hold that a world includ-
ing all of the same people would be bett er oﬀ  with a fall than without a 
fall, even though it could not be bett er for those who suﬀ er eternally bro-
ken relationship with God. The good of having participated in making 
the world a bett er place would not individually oﬀ set the quite personal 
cost of entering hell or even being annihilated? Barring a commitment 
to universalism,30 it seems once again, from this angle, that on the Felix 
Culpa view the value of the extravagance of God’s sacrifi ce is made to be 
more valuable than the right relationship with God that the sacrifi ce is 
meant to restore.
On a related note, Plantinga maintains that one positive byproduct of 
his Felix Culpa theodicy is that, “we get a clear resolution of the Supra/Infra 
debate: the Supras are right” (p. 12). He casts the debate as a question about 
the order of God’s decree with respect to salvation and permitt ing the fall. 
As Louis Berkhof puts it, “the question is, whether the decrees to create 
and permit the fall were means to the decree of redemption.”31 If it is the 
case that God’s decree to permit sin is in fact motivated by his desire to 
provide salvation, then it is his decree to save which is the more basic or 
fundamental. It seems to me that theologically there is much to aﬃ  rm in 
Plantinga’s position, particularly the priority of God’s self-giving love over 
God’s decision to permit evil in the world. I have argued against Plantinga’s 
notion that evil itself is necessary to fulfi lling the dictates of God’s love. But 
this in no way detracts from the fact that we have, in the incarnation and 
the atonement, the revelation of God in the mind-blowing radicality of his 
love for creatures. Furthermore, it seems altogether correct to view all that 
God does, including his permitt ing evil and suﬀ ering, to be apart of and 
motivated by his love. But this may also give us a reason to step back from 
any traditional supra- or infralapsarianism.
The supra/infra debate was not merely about the relative priority of sal-
vation to the fall.32 This debate was focused squarely on the nature of the 
election and reprobation of individual people in God’s sovereign decree.33 
Negatively, the question was about whether God actively reprobates some 
(Supralapsarianism) or passively chooses not to elect some of the fallen (In-
fralapsarianism). The Supras held that in the logical order of God’s decree 
his decision to elect some and reprobate others was primary. The Infras 
held that, in the logical order of God’s decree, permitt ing the fall came prior 
to election. God then decrees to elect some and leaves the rest in their sin. 
Plantinga’s gloss on Supralapsarianism seems superior to the traditional 
view because it moves the debate away from reprobation and focuses us 
on the priority and great-making quality of God’s redeeming love. We are 
left , however, with the unanswered agent-centered concerns. A traditional 
Superlapsarian holds that what is primary for God is his decree to, “glorify 
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Himself, and particularly to magnify His grace and justice in the salva-
tion of some and the perdition of other rational creatures.”34 The question I 
would raise to Plantinga’s formulation in light of this is: given the nature of 
God’s personal self-sacrifi cing love, could the value of the world in general 
actually be advanced by means of the cost of an eternally broken relation-
ship with God for some particular individuals?
Is Theodicy a Good Idea?
These objections, I believe, have enough force to question seriously 
whether, from a Christian point of view, a Felix Culpa theodicy ought to be 
embraced. But does this mean that all att empts at theodicy are somehow 
mistaken? Who is right, the Plantinga of 1983 who says that Christians 
should admit that we don’t know why God permits evil, or the Plantinga 
of the new millennium, who recommends that Christian philosophers 
should turn to the task of understanding evil from a Christian perspective? 
It’s possible that both are correct. Seeing evil from a Christian perspective 
may bring us to the aﬃ  rmation that we don’t know why God permits it. 
We are, it seems to me, bounded by two important convictions. First, the 
world actualized by God, taken not just in its present condition but in-
cluding also its eschatological consummation, is good. It must be, it is the 
world actualized by the God made know to us in Jesus Christ. By his own 
incarnation, obedience and suﬀ ering, God reverses the death and undoes 
the suﬀ ering eﬀ ected by sin, such that the eschatological end outweighs 
the pain and cost of permitt ing evil. Aﬃ  rming this much stops short of 
making sense of evil, and for good reason. The second binding conviction 
for the Christian is that evil is thoroughly evil. It is not good in evil cloth-
ing. And, therefore, evil does not make sense—it is irrational. Understand-
ing why God might permit evil is one thing, understanding how it is that 
evil emerges as something to permit is something else entirely.
A free will theodicy and a Felix Culpa theodicy can be helpfully con-
trasted to illumine the point. In a theodicy that explains evil as something 
that arises as a result of the misuse of creaturely freedom, we are given an 
explanation as to why God might permit evil, but evil itself is not made a 
necessary component of achieving a higher good. Though evil might be 
inevitable, we do not know that it is, because we are given no explanation 
for why evil emerges in the exercise of creaturely freedom. If a good crea-
ture understands that an evil choice will distort relationship with God and 
lead to death, there is no explanation possible for why a creature might 
choose evil which does not already presuppose some prior evil that has 
degraded in some way the proper function of that free creature’s will.35 In 
Christian scripture evil is not explained, we fi nd that it is permitt ed, con-
founded and fi nally eradicated.
In a Felix Culpa theodicy, evil is made a necessary component of achiev-
ing a higher good.36 This imbues evil with purpose and makes evil fi nally 
reasonable. We now do have an explanation for evil, though we still have 
no immediate explanation for how evil might emerge in the exercise of 
creaturely freedom. A Molinist like Plantinga would still maintain that 
God does not directly cause or commit evil. The emergence of evil remains 
a mystery. But we do know that evil is intentionally and originally willed 
96 Faith and Philosophy
by God, he desires it to emerge. Unlike a free will theodicy, in a Felix Culpa 
theodicy God desires evil as a means to his good purposes. This move has 
a dangerously distorting moral and theological impact. We can no longer 
condemn evil and injustice as wholly antithetical to what is good. Evil is 
ultimately the will of God. So much so that we can say of the fall: ‘O happy 
sin.’ Defenders of either theodicy may maintain that God’s hands remain 
clean, creatures carry the blame for evil, evil is ultimately destroyed and 
creation is redeemed. The contrast between these two theodicies is a razor’s 
breadth but a chasm’s depth.37 In a free will theodicy it is the permission of 
evil that is essential to the greater good that God intends, in the Felix Culpa 
theodicy it is the evil itself that is essential to the greater good. Evil is made 
reasonable as a functional good.38 While the goodness of God may not 
be thrown into question it still creates for us moral vertigo of theological 
proportions. Evil that makes sense, is no longer so bad—‘O Felix Culpa’ 
indeed. It seems, therefore, prudent from a Christian perspective to worry 
about theodicies that att empt to explain the emergence of evil in terms of 
the functional good of evil itself, rather than perhaps the functional good 
of the permitt ing of evil. Moreover, should we not resist a theodicy which 
would att empt to explain the source of the evil in a way that would make 
the emergence of evil rational or sensible?
Conclusion
If I have understood Plantinga correctly, there are two aspects to the 
great-making value that incarnation and atonement give a world which 
outweigh the required evil and suﬀ ering. The fi rst aspect is the radically 
self-sacrifi cing display of God’s love for creatures that have rejected him. 
The second is the potential for deeper intimacy with God that comes 
through suﬀ ering or through the experience of being rescued. Against 
the second aspect I advanced the argument that perhaps it is the incarna-
tion alone which wins for us the great enhancements in the intimacy of 
our relationship with God. It is not primarily our participation in Christ’s 
suﬀ ering or experience of redemption that enables an unrivalled close-
ness with Christ; it is instead, the fact that the Word became fl esh which 
enables an unparalleled divine-human communion. But the incarnation 
alone does not require suﬀ ering and evil, so neither then is evil required 
for enhancing the intimacy of human relationship with God. If it is not 
an enhancement in our relationship with God that necessitates evil, then 
Plantinga’s argument stands solely on the fi rst claim: that the value of the 
atonement, which outweighs the required evil and suﬀ ering, is its being 
an, otherwise impossible, towering display of God’s love. I have oﬀ ered 
three challenges to this claim. First, I suggested that it is the nature of 
God’s immutable love, unchanging across all possible worlds that gives 
incomparable value to those worlds. Sin or no sin, all possible worlds 
are such that God would have suﬀ ered to procure the redemption of his 
creatures even in the face of their rejection of him. And, there is no rea-
son to think that atonement is the only way God has to communicate to 
his creatures the depths of his love. Second, the Felix Culpa view seems 
to operate against the possibility that the locus of the value of states of 
aﬀ airs is derived from their contribution to right relationship with God 
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and all that that entails. On the Felix Culpa view it is worth severing rela-
tionship so that God can act out in love to restore it. And third, the Felix 
Culpa view treats the cost of atonement as an end rather than a means, 
elevating the action of suﬀ ering love over God’s purpose and goal of right 
relationship between God and creatures. In addition to these objections 
I raised the concern that, in Plantinga’s formulation, there appears to be 
an unmanageable tension between the good of a world for a particular 
individual and the good of the world as a whole. If we are to take agent-
centered concerns seriously it is diﬃ  cult to imagine a personal gain for 
one who remains eternally alienated from God. And fi nally, I argued 
from a Christian perspective against any formulation of the Felix Culpa 
theodicy, because it att empts to defend God’s originally permitt ing evil 
by turning evil into a functional good, thereby giving evil a kind of am-
biguous rational legitimacy.
There is nothing ambiguous about the Christian position on evil, sin, 
suﬀ ering, injustice and the fall. “Love does not delight in evil but rejoices 
with the truth” (1 Cor. 13:4, NIV). It seems to me that the Felix Culpa de-
fender agrees with this. What is worth rejoicing about is not the fall itself, 
but what God does in response to it. What is happy is not sin, but who 
God is, that he will do and has done everything that it takes to overcome 
evil and give us close, personal, life-giving communion with him. What 
is fortunate is that the God of all power, wisdom and love has revealed 
himself to us in the incarnate Christ who suﬀ ered, died and rose again to 
invalidate evil and suﬀ ering.39
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the God of all wisdom and goodness choose out of all possible worlds. The 
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possible worlds.
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from the somewhat masochistic notion that suﬀ ering is the place of deepest 
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for sin certainly does.
22. This is a helpful way to think about the immutability of God. No mat-
ter how the activity of God might diﬀ er from one possible world to the next, 
in every possible world God is such that he would do what he freely does in 
any particular possible world.
23. My thanks to Alan Torrance for suggesting this interpretation of Plant-
inga’s argument.
24. Plantinga acknowledges this weakness in his argument and simply 
proposes ignoring it: “It is hard to imagine what God could do that is in fact 
comparable to incarnation and atonement; but perhaps this is just a limitation 
of our imagination. But since this is so hard to imagine, I propose that we 
ignore those possible worlds, if there are any, in which God does not arrange 
for incarnation and atonement, but does something else of comparable excel-
lence” (p. 10).
25. As Luke Tallon suggested to me, one could argue that by the incarna-
tion alone God reveals that he has given himself to us. No greater gift  of love 
than this could be perceived.
26. It may be noted that there is some patt ern resemblance between this ob-
jection and one Plantinga credits to Michael Schrynamacher under the head-
ing: ‘Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy?’ (pp. 21–25). But the objection here 
is not that a Felix Culpa theodicy has God treating people as means instead 
of ends. My objection is that in a Felix Culpa theodicy the sacrifi ce involved 
in atonement is misconstrued as an end instead of a means. The sacrifi ce of 
the atonement is a means to the real great-making feature of the world, right 
relationship with God. In no obvious way does right relationship with God 
require sin and evil.
27. Perhaps, as one of the editors suggested in response to an earlier draft  
of this paper, the prodigal son can have a relationship of greater value than the 
son who never went astray. Of course this fails for all sorts of exegetical rea-
sons, but most importantly the fact is that each son experiences estrangement 
from the father and both would have been bett er oﬀ  never to have turned 
away from the love of the father. The fact that “he who is forgiven litt le, loves 
litt le” is merely an assessment of the darkness of our hearts in our already 
fallen condition. It is not grounds to assume that the fall was required to en-
able a depth of love otherwise unreachable.
28. There is something to the Munchausen objection—that the Felix Culpa 
view makes God out to be “like a father who throws his children into the river 
so that he can then heroically rescue them” (pp. 21–22). Greater value is placed 
on the heroism of the rescue as a demonstration of great love than is placed on 
the condition achieved by the rescue, secure and right relationship with God.
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problem of evil and the supra-infra debate, and for that reason it is assumed 
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31. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans, 1996), p. 119.
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34. Berkhof, p. 119.
35. The garden story involves the deception of an already fallen angel, and 
we are given no reasonable explanation for the fall of Satan.
36. Donald McKim’s defi nition is defi cient in this regard. He explains 
Felix Culpa as, “an expression of faith in God’s ultimate power to bring good 
out of evil.” Clearly Felix Culpa directs its att ention to the allegedly good and 
necessary role that evil plays in God’s plans, Donald K. McKim, Westmin-
ster Dictionary of Theological Terms (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1996), p. 108.
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38. I am not suggesting that we deny that evil is in fact used for good. 
Once evil is permitt ed and then emerges in the world God confounds evil, 
bringing good results from it. The chief example is the atonement, the suﬀ er-
ing and human death of God which God uses to undo evil permanently. But 
this is merely aﬃ  rming the triumph of God’s goodness over senseless evil, it 
is not suggesting that God’s goodness needs evil in some ultimate way.
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